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ABSTRACT
Location Privacy Protection in Social Networks
by
Mohammad Reza Nosouhi
Social networks have become more ubiquitous due to new advances in smart-
phone technology. This has provided an opportunity for social network service
providers to utilise location information of users in their services. For example,
Facebook Places, Foursquare and Yelp are popular social networks that mostly rely
on utilising users’ location data in their services. They offer a variety of useful
services, from location recommendations to nearby friend alerts. However, protect-
ing location privacy of users is still an open challenge for social network service
providers. It has been shown that hiding real identity and choosing a pseudonym
does not guarantee to protect a user’s privacy since privacy may be invaded by
analysing position data only. This is really a big issue since other private informa-
tion of users can be revealed by analysing their location data (e.g., home address,
health condition, interests, etc.).
In this study, we investigate the location privacy issue of social networks and pro-
pose several solutions. We classify the proposed solutions into three categories based
on the selected approaches, i.e. (i) differential privacy-based, (ii) cryptography-
based, and (iii) anonymity-based solutions. We first study the approach in which
differential privacy is utilised to preserve privacy of users. In this regard, we develop
Distance–Based Location Privacy Protection mechanism (DBLP2), a customisable
location privacy protection approach that is uniquely designed for social network
users. It utilises the concept of social distance to generalise users’ location data be-
fore it is published in a social network. The level of generalisation is decided based
on the social distance between users.
Secondly, we study cryptography-based methods for location privacy protection
in Location–Based Services (LBS) and social networks. In this domain, we propose
three cryptography-based and privacy–aware location verification schemes to pre-
serve location privacy of users: (i) Privacy–Aware and Secure Proof Of pRoximiTy
(PASPORT), (ii) Secure, Privacy–Aware and collusion Resistant poSition vErifica-
tion (SPARSE), and (iii) a blockchain–based location verification scheme. These
schemes prevent location spoofing attacks conducted by dishonest users while pro-
tect location privacy of users. To the best of our knowledge, majority of the existing
location verification schemes do not preserve location privacy of users.
Thirdly, we investigate anonymity as another approach to preserve users’ pri-
vacy in social networks. In this regard, we first study the relevant protocols and
discuss their features and drawbacks. Then, we introduce Harmonized and Stable
DC–net (HSDC–net), a self–organizing protocol for anonymous communications in
social networks. As far as we know, social networks do not offer any secure anony-
mous communication service. In social networks, privacy of users is preserved using
pseudonymity, i.e., users select a pseudonym for their communications instead of
their real identity. However, it has been shown that pseudonymity does not always
result in anonymity (perfect privacy) if users’ activities in social media are linkable.
This makes users’ privacy vulnerable to deanonymization attacks. Thus, by employ-
ing a secure anonymous communication service, social network service providers will
be able to effectively preserve users’ privacy.
We perform extensive experiments and provide comprehensive security and pri-
vacy analysis to evaluate performance of the proposed schemes and mechanisms.
Regarding the DBLP2 mechanism, our extensive analysis shows that it offers the
optimum data utility regarding the trade–off between privacy protection and data
utility. In addition, our experimental results indicate that DBLP2 is capable of
offering variable location privacy protection and resilience to post processing. For
the SPARSE scheme, our analysis and experiments show that SPARSE provides
privacy protection as well as security properties for users including integrity, un-
forgeability and non–transferability of the location proofs. Moreover, it achieves a
highly reliable performance against collusions. To validate performance of the PAS-
PORT scheme, we implement a prototype of the proposed scheme on the Android
platform. Extensive experiments indicate that the proposed method can efficiently
protect location–based applications against fake submissions. For the proposed
blockchain–based scheme, our prototype implementation on the Android platform
shows that the proposed scheme outperforms other currently deployed location proof
schemes. Finally, our prototype implementation of the HSDC–net protocol shows
that it achieves low latencies that makes it a practical protocol.
In summary, this research study focuses on developing new mechanisms for pre-
serving location privacy of social network users. This is done through different
approaches. Moreover, extensive effort is made to make the current location–related
schemes and protocols privacy–aware. In this regard, several solutions in the form
of scheme, mechanism, and protocol are introduced and their performance is eval-
uated. The results of this research work have also been presented in seven papers
published in peer-revewied journals and conferences.
Keywords: anonymous communications; customizable differential privacy; data
privacy; DC–net; location privacy; location–based services; location proof; social
distance; social networks.
